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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case raises an interesting question of liability 
which has its origin in the coordinated efforts of the Government 
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and manufacturers of optical medical devices to advance the cause 
of medical treatment through research, experimentation, and 
optimum freedom for scientific investigation in the pursuit of 
that purpose. 
 In 1981, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved for clinical investigation an intraocular lens 
manufactured by defendant Optical Radiation Corporation (ORC). An 
intraocular lens (IOL) is a lens intended to replace surgically 
the natural lens of the human eye.   In December 1985, Dr. Henry 
Scimeca, an investigator approved by the FDA, implanted in the 
eye of plaintiff Helen Gile, who suffered from cataracts, an ORC 
model UV11H intraocular lens.  Prior to the surgery, Gile signed 
an informed consent form, which she claims that she did not read 
before signing.  Gile subsequently had the ORC lens surgically 
removed from her left eye, and is now legally blind in that eye. 
 In May of 1992, Gile commenced this products liability 
and negligence action against ORC in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey.  ORC removed the case to the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey.1  Thereafter, ORC moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that Gile's claims were expressly 
preempted under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or 
the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.  The district court entered 
summary judgment in favor of ORC and dismissed the complaint with 
prejudice.  Gile timely appealed to this court.  We affirm. 
                     
1The district court exercised diversity jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal from a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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I. 
 This court exercises plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment, and we apply the same test the district court 
should have utilized initially.  Oritani Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. 
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when it is demonstrated that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-32 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  An 
issue of material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  In 
deciding a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences 
must be drawn in favor of the non-movant.  Oritani, 989 F.2d at 
638.   
 At the heart of this action are the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 ("MDA"), 21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq., to the 
FDCA.  Pursuant to the FDCA, and amendments thereto, including 
the MDA, the FDA strictly regulates the development, marketing, 
and monitoring of medical devices.  The MDA sets forth various 
requirements concerning the safety and effectiveness of medical 
devices and the approvals to be obtained from the FDA before 
bringing a device to the market.  The MDA also limits entities 
other than the FDA from imposing requirements on the makers of 
medical devices and the process by which those devices are 
discovered, investigated, and manufactured.  Section 360k(a), the 
focus of this appeal, provides: 
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[N]o State or political subdivision of a 
State may establish or continue in effect 
with respect to a device intended for human 
use any requirement--  
 
(1) which is different from, or in 
addition to, any requirement applicable 
under this chapter to the device, and 
 
(2) which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement 
applicable to the device under this 
chapter. 
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
 In enacting the MDA, Congress recognized the need for 
special treatment of investigational devices which, by their very 
nature, could not meet the requirements applicable to marketed 
devices: 
It is the purpose of this subsection to 
encourage, to the extent consistent with the 
protection of the public health and safety 
and with ethical standards, the discovery and 
development of useful devices intended for 
human use and to that end to maintain optimum 
freedom for scientific investigators in their 
pursuit of that purpose. 
21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1).  Persons seeking an exemption from pre-
market approval for a particular medical device (an 
"investigational device exemption" or "IDE") must apply to the 
FDA for permission to undertake clinical investigations.  Id. at 
§ 360j(g)(2)(A). 
 The FDA issued specific regulations governing the 
development of IOLs.  21 C.F.R. § 813 et seq. (the "IOL 
Regulations").  The regulations require a detailed application, 
describing the device under investigation and setting forth a 
plan for studying its use in human subjects, which is reviewed by 
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both the FDA and an institutional review committee.  21 C.F.R. 
§§813.20, 813.30.  The device must be described in sufficient 
detail to permit "a knowledgeable judgment about the anticipated 
safety and effectiveness of the lens."  Id. at § 813.20(b)(2). 
After approval, the committee has a duty to monitor the clinical 
investigation.  Id. at § 813.65.  The regulations detail the 
monitoring of the studies and set forth reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, including evaluation of complaints 
about devices.  Id. at §§ 813.46, 813.180 et seq.  Under the IOL 
Regulations, the FDA can refuse an exemption if it finds, inter 
alia, that the lens may be unsafe or ineffective, that the 
investigational plan is not a reasonable one, or that 
manufacturing, storage, and implantation methods do not assure 
adequate safety and effectiveness.  21 C.F.R. § 813.30(c).  In 
sum, the IOL regulations broadly govern nearly all facets of the 
investigational program.  See Covey v. Surgidev Corp., 815 F. 
Supp. 1089, 1095 (N.D.Ohio 1993) ("[t]o say that the regulations 
covering intraocular lenses are expansive would be an 
understatement").  
II. 
 Gile first argues that Congress never intended to 
preempt state common law when it passed the MDA.  She contends 
that the word "requirement" in 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) refers only to 
positive legislative enactments and not to state tort common law 
claims.  This argument must be rejected, however, in light of 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 
(1992).  The Cipollone Court addressed the Public Health 
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Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which preempted certain 
"requirement[s] or prohibition[s] . . . imposed under state law." 
The Court rejected the contention that the act did not extend to 
state tort claims: 
The phrase "[n]o requirement or prohibition" 
sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction 
between positive enactments and common law; 
to the contrary, those words easily encompass 
obligations that take the form of common law 
rules.  As we noted in another context, 
"[state] regulation can be as effectively 
exerted through an award of damages as 
through some form of preventive relief.  The 
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed 
is designed to be, a potent method of 
governing conduct and controlling policy." 
 Although portions of the legislative 
history of the 1969 Act suggest that Congress 
was primarily concerned with positive 
enactments by States and localities, the 
language of the Act plainly reaches beyond 
such enactments.  
112 S.Ct. at 2620; 120 L.Ed.2d at 426 (citations and footnote 
omitted).  Thus, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the 
word "requirement," in the context of an express preemption 
provision, includes state law claims.  See also Stamps v. 
Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 86 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 
1130, 1133 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993). 
 Gile contends that there cannot be express preemption 
unless Congress uses "the words 'common law' or something 
analogous" to indicate its intent to preempt such claims. 
However, the MDA, providing "no State or political subdivision of 
a State may establish . . . any requirement . . . different from, 
or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this 
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chapter," is indistinguishable from the act at issue in 
Cipollone, which provided, "[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . 
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising 
. . . of any cigarettes."  Thus, Gile's argument that Congress 
needs to explicitly provide that common law claims are preempted 
in order to find express preemption is unpersuasive. 
 Gile further argues that even if her tort claims in 
general are preempted under § 360k, her specific claims based on 
lack of informed consent and adulterated products are exempt from 
preemption.  First, she relies on 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20 and 50.25(c) 
as support for her contention that her claim for failure to 
obtain informed consent is not preempted.  Section 50.20, which 
addresses general requirements for informed consent, provides in 
part: "No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include 
any exculpatory language through which the subject or the 
representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the 
subject's legal rights, or releases or appears to release the 
investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its agents from 
liability for negligence."  Section 50.25(c), which addresses 
elements of informed consent, provides: "[t]he informed consent 
requirements in these regulations are not intended to preempt any 
applicable Federal, State, or local laws which require additional 
information to be disclosed for informed consent to be legally 
effective."  Gile further notes that the court in  Slater v. 
Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S.Ct. 327 (1992), held that not all claims are 
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preempted under § 360k, including claims for informed consent. 
Id. at 1334.   
 The Slater court, however, stated that 21 C.F.R. §50.20 
"preserves the patient's common law rights outside of the limited 
scope of the preemption provision.  It does not . . . repeal the 
preemption provision itself."  Id.  Similarly, the court in 
Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744 (M.D.Pa. 1992) 
concluded that "the consent regulation should be read to prevent 
patients from waiving legal rights which are not preempted under 
federal law.  That is, those common law rights which are retained 
by a patient and not preempted by the federal scheme may not be 
waived by the patient."  Id. at 750 (emphasis in original).  
Gile, however, ignores that the predicate of a claim for informed 
consent addresses the duty of the physician, not the 
manufacturer, to the patient.  See e.g., Largey v. Rothman, 540 
A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988); Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 
1989).  She is unable to provide any support for her contention 
that she is entitled to bring such a claim against the 
manufacturer of an experimental product.  Moreover, despite the 
completion of discovery in this action,  Gile has not offered any 
proof to support her vague allegation that ORC failed to provide 
her physician with the proper forms and information necessary to 
obtain informed consent.    
 Gile next quotes the first sentence of section 
808.1(d)(6)(ii) of the FDA Regulations, which states: 
"[g]enerally, [§ 360k(a)] does not preempt a State or local 
requirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or 
9 
misbranded devices."  21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii).2  But the next 
sentence, not quoted by Gile, provides: 
Where, however, such a prohibition has the 
effect of establishing a substantive 
requirement for a specific device, e.g., a 
specific labeling requirement, then the 
prohibition will be preempted if the 
requirement is different from, or in addition 
to, a Federal requirement established under 
the act. 
Id.  This action by Gile challenging the design of the Stableflex 
lens and the warnings and instructions that accompanied it, if 
successful, would impermissibly result in new common law 
standards for lens design and warnings.  See e.g., Stamps, 984 
F.2d at 1421-22; King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36; Slater, 961 F.2d at 
1333.  Thus, it is preempted.  Moreover, read in its entirety, 
section 808.1 prohibits, not supports, challenges such as Gile's 
to FDA requirements affecting the safety and effectiveness of 
investigational devices under the guise of product liability 
actions by reflecting the FDA's determination that the word 
"requirement," as used in § 360k, includes "court decisions."3   
                     
221 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) sets forth examples of state or local 
requirements that are not preempted by § 360k.  Significantly, 
the list of requirements exempted from § 360k does not include 
state tort or common law claims.   
3Section 808.1(b) states: 
 
[Section 360k provides that] no State or 
political subdivision of a State may 
establish or continue in effect any 
requirement with respect to a medical device 
intended for human use having the force and 
effect of law (whether established by 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or court 
decision), which is different from, or in 
addition to, any requirement applicable to 
such device under any provision of the act 
and which relates to the safety or 
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 Similarly, Gile's argument that her claims are not 
preempted because the IOL was "adulterated" within the meaning of 
21 U.S.C. § 351(i) must fail.4  The FDA can determine an 
investigational device to be adulterated if requirements under 
the IDE are not complied with.  Here, the FDA made no findings of 
adulteration and the record does not contain any facts to support 
such a claim.  Moreover, violations of the FDCA do not create 
private rights of action.  See e.g., Pacific Trading Co. v. 
Wilson & Co., Inc., 547 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1976); Kemp v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (E.D.Mich. 1993); Brinkman 
v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 33, 35 (M.D.Pa.), aff'd, 902 F.2d 
1558 (3d Cir. 1989).  Thus, only the government has a right to 
take action with respect to adulterated products.  Additionally, 
as noted by the district court, to the extent Gile's adulteration 
claim is derivative of her other claims for inadequate design, 
manufacture, and warnings, she cannot overcome a finding of 
preemption merely by claiming that the product was adulterated. 
III. 
 Every court that has considered the issue of the 
preemptive effect of § 360k in the context of ORC's product, has 
                                                                  
effectiveness of the device or to any other 
matter included in a requirement applicable 
to the device under the act. 
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (emphasis added).  See Stamps, 984 F.2d at 
1421 n.1.; King, 983 F.2d at 1134; Slater, 961 F.2d at 1331. 
421 U.S.C. § 351(i) provides that a device shall be deemed to be 
adulterated "[i]f it is a device for which an exemption has been 
granted under section 360j(g) of this title for investigational 
use and the person who was granted such exemption or any 
investigator who uses such device under such exemption fails to 
comply with a requirement prescribed by or under such section." 
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ruled in favor of ORC.  See Slater, 961 F.2d 1330; Hinners v. 
Optical Radiation Corp., 15 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) (per 
curiam); Rogers v. Optical Radiation Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11th 
Cir. 1994).  In Slater, as here, the plaintiff alleged that 
following implantation of a Stableflex lens, his vision 
deteriorated and the implant had to be removed, leaving him with 
permanent damage.  961 F.2d at 1332.  The plaintiff in Slater 
advanced causes of actions for strict liability, breach of 
warranty, failure to provide adequate warnings, negligent design, 
and failure to conduct proper clinical testing.  Slater v. 
Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370, 371-72 (N.D. Ill. 
1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992).  The lens in Slater, 
like the one in this case, was governed by the IOL Regulations. 
961 F.2d at 1331. 
 The district court in Slater found that all of the 
plaintiff's claims were expressly preempted by § 360k, and 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the entire complaint. 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that § 360k(a) forbids 
states to subject a medical device to requirements "different 
from, or in addition to" requirements that relate to the safety 
and effectiveness of the device.  The Slater court noted that 
although the regulations imposed no requirement concerning the 
specific design of intraocular lenses, 
[t]he FDA can hardly be expected to specify 
the safe and effective design of a device 
when it is still experimental.  If there were 
a known safe and effective design, the device 
would no longer be experimental.  The point 
of the experiment is to find out whether it 
is safe and effective. 
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961 F.2d at 1333 (citation omitted).  The court concluded: 
The theory underlying the complaint is that 
the design of the Stableflex was not 
sufficiently safe and effective to allow it 
to be used on human beings.  This theory sets 
up a direct collision with federal policy. 
The FDA decided, whether rightly or wrongly, 
but pursuant to regulations the validity of 
which the plaintiff does not question, that 
the Stableflex could be sold, subject only to 
requirements, procedural in character and, so 
far as appears, fully complied with, designed 
to assure that this experimental distribution 
was in fact a worthwhile experiment.  The 
plaintiff wishes in the name of state tort 
law to impose additional requirements--namely 
that the Stableflex have had design 
characteristics that it lacked--and this 
engrafting of additional requirements 
relating to safety or effectiveness is 
forbidden by the preemption provision in the 
Medical Devices Amendments. 
Id. 
 Gile argues that Slater is not persuasive because the 
court noted that preemption "is limited to efforts by states to 
impose sanctions for compliance with federal regulations relating 
to the safety or efficacy of the experimental lenses."  961 F.2d 
at 1334.  Gile submits that she is not seeking to impose 
sanctions for compliance with regulations, but rather is seeking 
damages for injury received and for the failure to warn of the 
danger of the experiment.  The quoted dicta from Slater, however, 
preceded the court's observation that preemption under § 360k 
would not affect claims based on negligence in the implantation 
of a lens, negligence in the removal of a lens, contamination of 
the lens by bacteria or fungi, or medical battery resulting from 
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failure to obtain the patient's informed consent to the 
procedure.  Id.   
 Notably, all of these claims might be brought against a 
physician, not against the lens manufacturer.  The dicta does not 
detract from Slater's holding that the plaintiff's claims for 
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty against the 
manufacturer were preempted under § 360k as impermissible 
attempts to impose additional safety and effectiveness 
requirements on the manufacturer.  See also Rogers, 12 F.3d 194 
(11th Cir. 1994) (affirming entry of summary judgment in favor of 
ORC on plaintiff's causes of action for design defect, inadequate 
warning, breach of warranty, and inadequate testing on express 
preemption grounds); Hinners, 15 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claims regarding safety and 
effectiveness of intraocular lenses on preemption grounds). 
 In the only IOL case within this circuit, Hunsaker v. 
Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744 (M.D.Pa. 1992), the court agreed 
with Slater that "the standards implicit in the state tort 
actions would be 'different from or in addition to' those 
requirements of both the FDCA and the IDE regulations."  Id. at 
752 (citation omitted).  The court reasoned that the difference 
between experimental devices and those approved for marketing 
supports a finding of express preemption under § 360k.  Id. at 
749.  The court concluded: 
A jury determination that the device is not 
sufficiently safe and effective would not 
only be contrary to the experimental purposes 
of the exemption, but, more important, would 
directly conflict with the FDA's contrasting 
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judgment.  Therefore, state tort law invoked 
to challenge the safety or effectiveness of a 
IOL which is part of an FDA investigation is 
federally preempted. 
Id. at 752-53.  Thus, the district court's finding of preemption 
under § 360k is in conformance with the holdings of the vast 
majority of cases which have addressed this issue.5   
IV. 
 Next, Gile argues that public policy favors remedies 
for victims of medical experimentation.  Gile erroneously 
contends that if preemption is permitted, medical device 
manufacturers will be granted immunity for all manner of improper 
acts.  As explained by ORC, violations of the FDCA and FDA 
regulations are punishable by significant fines, civil penalties, 
and imprisonment.  Similarly, Gile's assertion that preemption 
will encourage shoddy clinical investigations and development of 
defective medical devices lack merit.  As shown by the detailed 
regulations discussed above, it is unlikely that a non-
efficacious or unsafe investigational device would survive FDA 
review. 
 Moreover, Gile ignores the countervailing public policy 
of the discovery and development of new products.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360j(g) (one purpose of investigational device exemptions is 
"to maintain optimum freedom for scientific investigators").  As 
explained by the Slater court: 
                     
5In light of our statutory interpretation and the extensive 
authority discussed above, we reject Gile's sole reliance on two 
lower court cases from Louisiana, Lewis v. Intermedics 
Intraocular, No. 93-0007 (E.D.La. Dec. 9, 1993) and Mitchell v. 
IOLAB Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. La. 1988). 
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[I]f experimental procedures are subject to 
hindsight evaluation by juries, so that 
failed experiments threaten to impose 
enormous tort liability on the experimenter, 
there will be fewer experimental treatments, 
and patients will suffer. 
961 F.2d at 1334.  Thus, state tort claims run counter to the 
important public policy, recognized by Congress, of promoting 
scientific inventions. 
 Finally, Gile argues that the district court's grant of 
summary judgment based on federal preemption encompassed both 
forum and claim preemption, leaving her without a remedy.  She 
contends that public policy disfavors preemption of common law 
where no remedies are available to consumers injured by the 
unreasonable conduct of a manufacturer.  However, Congress has 
the power to displace state tort law remedies, and clearly did so 
by enacting the MDA.  See e.g., Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421 (citing 
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile, Co., 450 U.S. 
311, 331 (1981)).  Moreover, Gile is not precluded from asserting 
a right of redress in the state forum because her claims against 
her physician are not preempted under the MDA.  See Slater, 961 
F.2d at 1334; Hunsaker, 818 F. Supp. at 751.  Thus, despite her 
arguments to the contrary, Gile is not left without a remedy 
because she may still pursue her claims, if any, against her 
physician in state court.   
V. 
 There being no genuine issues as to any material facts 
in this case, the district court committed no error in rendering 
summary judgment in favor of ORC as a matter of law. Accordingly, 
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the judgment of the district court in favor of Optical Radiation 
Corporation will be affirmed. 
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